Abstract. We study statistical tests with binary output that rarely outputs one, which we call nearly one-sided statistical tests. We provide an efficient reduction establishing improved security for the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit against nearly one-sided tests. The analysis is extended to prove the security of the Blum-Micali pseudo-random generator combined with the Goldreich-Levin bit. Finally, some applications where nearly one-sided tests occur naturally are discussed.
Introduction
Many algorithms are probabilistic and therefore require a source of randomness to be implemented correctly. This is true in particular for most cryptographic algorithms. Obtaining random material is often a hard and time consuming process and therefore it is convenient to use a pseudo-random generator to generate much random looking material from a short truly random seed. One would of course like to have a guarantee that by exchanging random material for the output of a generator, the performance of the algorithms are not changed in a harmful way.
The pioneering works of Blum and Micali [5] and Yao [15] laid the foundation of the theory of pseudo-randomness. Blum and Micali showed how to construct a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) whose security is based on the hardness of solving the discrete logarithm problem. More specifically they proved and used the fact that the most significant bit is a hard-core predicate for exponentiation. A predicate b is a hard-core predicate for a function g if it is not feasible to determine the boolean value of b(x) efficiently given the value of g(x). In [10] Goldreich and Levin showed how to construct a hard-core predicate for any one-way function. This construction can be applied on the above-mentioned PRBG so that the security can be based on the one-wayness of an arbitrary permutation f . The proof of security in [5] was a polynomial reduction from solving the discrete logarithm problem (or if we use the result from [10] inverting f ) to breaching the security of the bit generator.
In this work we analyze the security of the well-known pseudo-random generator obtained by combining the works [5] and [10] . We refer to this generator as BMGL. As noted in previous works (e.g., [9] , [10] and [13] ) the exact efficiency of a reduction between two different cryptographic primitives is of vital interest when determining the practical security consequences of the reduction. Examples of more recent works that deal with the issue to bridge the gap between theoretical complexity-based cryptography and practical cryptography by improved reductions and analysis are [3] and [6] . For a more extensive list see [2] . In the case of BMGL, the reduction relates the one-wayness of a permutation to the pseudo-randomness of the output from BMGL. A distribution is considered to be pseudo-random if there is no statistical test, from a specific set of admissible tests, that more than negligibly can distinguish between elements from that distribution and from the uniform distribution. (A distribution is in fact not considered to be pseudo-random, but instead an ensemble of distributions. For simplicity reasons we do not make this distinction throughout the introduction.) Normally the set of admissible tests is specified by a maximum running time. Improvements to the security reduction of BMGL and its analysis have been made earlier by Rackoff (explained in [7] ), Levin [14] and Håstad and Näslund [12] .
Earlier analyses of reductions have characterized the efficiency of a statistical test D, distinguishing the distributions X and Y , by using a measure δ such that (1)
In this paper we consider nearly one-sided statistical tests which are tests that, on truly random input, almost always output zero and rarely output one. The measure in (1) does not capture whether or not a test is nearly one-sided and therefore we introduce the notion of a parameterized distinguisher, which for a test and a certain pair of input distributions imposes two thresholds, separating the corresponding output distributions of the test. We say that a test D (δ 1 Thus, if δ 1 is small and X is the uniform distribution, the test is considered to be nearly one-sided. (We do not formally define "small" but instead use the parameterized distinguisher to express formal results in this paper.) The use of this characterization of a distinguisher enables a more careful analysis of the reduction from inverting a permutation to distinguishing between the output of BMGL and the uniform distribution. In particular, if only nearly one-sided tests are considered to be admissible the new analysis obtains a substantial increase of the efficiency of the reduction. This limitation turns out to be quite natural in many applications. The notion of nearly one-sided statistical tests has previously been investigated in [4] . The outline of this paper is as follows: In Section 3 the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit is explained and a motivating discussion is held on why low rate predictors are more powerful than ordinary predictors when list decoding the Hadamard code. In the next section we prove a theorem about list decoding Hadamard codes with both erasures and errors and in Section 5 this theorem is used to establish the reduction from inverting a function to predicting the Goldreich-Levin bit. Section 6 discusses nearly one-sided statistical tests and their connection with low rate predictors and in Section 7 the security of the BMGL is shown. Applications are considered in Section 8, in particular we study the security consequences of the use of a PRBG in signature and encryption schemes. The paper is concluded with some open questions.
Notation
In this work we use the following notation:
1. By [m] we mean the set {1, . . . , m} and 2 [m] is the set of all subsets of [m]. 2. The xor operation is denoted by ⊕.
The function b(r, x)
is the inner product of r and x modulo 2. 4. The ith unit vector e i is a bit string containing only zeros, except for the ith bit (which is one). The dimension of e i is implicitly given by its use. 5. We let J, L , where J and L are sets, denote the size of J ∩ L modulo 2. 6. If S is a set we denote the size of the set by |S|. If x is a bit string, the length of x is denoted by |x|. 7. When the logarithmic function log is used without the base having been specified, it is implicit base 2. 8. The uniform distribution of bit strings of length n is denoted by U n .
The Goldreich-Levin Bit and List Decoding of Hadamard Code
Goldreich and Levin showed in [10] how to modify an arbitrary one-way function to make it have a hard-core predicate: if f is a one-way function, then b(r, x) (the inner product of r and x modulo 2) is a hard-core predicate for the one-way function f (r, x) = (r, f (x)). This means that there is no efficient algorithm that given (r, f (x)) as input (where r and x are drawn from the uniform distribution) can guess the value of b(r, x) significantly better than a random guess.
The above result is shown using a reduction from inverting f to predicting the value of b(r, x). The efficiency of the reduction depends on how well the bit b(r, x) is guessed, which usually is measured by the advantage ε(n) of the guessing algorithm P, often called the predictor:
The main part of the reduction consists of a list-decoding algorithm for the Hadamard code. The ith bit of the Hadamard code of x is exactly b(i, x), where i is interpreted in the natural way as a bit string of the same length as x. The task for a list-decoding algorithm is to produce a list of possible x, having oracle access to a Hadamard code with a certain fraction of errors. The algorithm should come with a lower bound on the probability that x appears in the list output and an upper bound on the number of oracle queries made. Given the value of f (x), the predictor P corresponds in a natural way to the oracle of the Hadamard code, and the advantage of P (over a fix x) is closely related to the number of errors of the oracle. Now suppose that we have a predictor P that on some input answers with high confidence and on other inputs just flips a coin. The informative answers from P (when it does not just flip a coin) would then be somewhat clouded by the random noise provided by the other answers. We therefore give the predictor more freedom by also letting it output ⊥ in those cases when the confidence in the prediction is low. Instead of characterizing this type of predictor with only its advantage in the traditional sense, we also use its rate, which is how often it outputs a prediction. The advantage is generalized in a natural way for this different type of predictor. Definition 1. A predictor P: {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1, ⊥} is said to have rate δ(n) and advantage ε(n) in predicting b(x, r ) from f (x) and r , where
Note that the advantage of P is not the advantage conditioned on that P always answers, Pr
, which could be natural to assume. Let us compare a predictor P with advantage ε and rate δ and a classical predictor P with the same advantage (and with rate 1). If we apply P and P on N samples of the form ( f (x), r ), P would answer correctly on ( − ε)N . On the other hand P would answer correctly on (δ/2 + ε)N samples and erroneously on (δ/2 − ε)δ N . The absolute difference between the number of correct and erroneous answers is the same for P and P , but P only answers on a δ-fraction of the samples while P answers on all of them. This means that when P answers, its confidence is higher than the confidence of the answers of P .
Going back to the list-decoding algorithm for the Hadamard code, this new type of predictor corresponds to a Hadamard code oracle with both errors and erasures, where the fraction of erasures is 1 − δ (where δ is the rate of the predictor). The heart of the improved reduction is in the analysis of the list-decoding algorithm with an oracle that has a relatively large part of erasures (or in other words a predictor with low rate). We briefly discuss why a predictor with low rate is more powerful than one with a higher rate and the same advantage. By more powerful we mean here that the predictor does not have to be called as many times in the list-decoding algorithm. Later we show how a nearly one-sided test for the Goldreich-Levin bit can be easily turned into a predictor with low rate.
Assume that P is a predictor with rate δ and advantage ε. Earlier analyses, that only made use of the advantage, have shown (see Section 2.5.2 of [7] ) that the number of needed calls to P should be at least proportional to ε −2 for the list-decoding algorithm to succeed with probability one-half. The probability that P makes a correct prediction is 1 2 δ + ε. We now ignore all the calls that received ⊥-answers from P. The probability that P, on each of the remaining calls, guesses correctly is then (
In some sense this gives us a not fully working predictor with advantage δ −1 ε, the problem being that it does not make predictions for all inputs and that it on average only makes one prediction per δ −1 calls. If the first problem mentioned can be dealt with in the list-decoding algorithm we can expect that the number of calls to P is proportional to the new advantage inverted and squared (according to the old analysis) times the extra factor of δ
. Note that if the advantage of P is at least a constant fraction of the rate, we have that δ = O(ε) and thus the number of calls needed would only be O(ε −1 ) compared with O(ε −2 ) before. In the proofs of Theorems 1 and 3 we show that this intuition really has merit.
List Decoding of Hadamard Code with Errors and Erasures
The main part of the proof that the Goldreich-Levin bit is a hard-core predicate, consists of a list-decoding algorithm of a binary Hadamard code with errors. To ensure that the power of the low rate of the predictor does not vanish, we repeat the analysis of the list-decoding algorithm (not the original one in [10] , but one due to Rackoff explained in [7] ) while letting the Hadamard code also contain erasures. As far as the author is aware of, no previous work has been done on list decoding the Hadamard code in the presence of errors and erasures.
Theorem 1. There is an algorithm LD that, on input l and n and with oracle access to a binary Hadamard code of x (where |x| = n) with an e-fraction of errors and an s-fraction of erasures, can output a list of 2 l elements in time O(nl2 l ) asking n2 l oracle queries such that the probability that x is contained in the list is at least one-half if l ≥ log 2 (8n(e + c)/(c − e)
2 + 1), where c def
=1 − s − e (the fraction of correct answers from the oracle).
Proof. Let C be an oracle that represents a Hadamard code of a fixed x with an efraction of errors and an s-fraction of erasures. In Table 1 the list-decoding algorithm LD C is defined. First we prove its correctness with respect to the claim made in Theorem 1 that it outputs x with at least probability one-half. We then analyze its time complexity.
Correctness of LD C : We start by proving the following claim about the value of C (e i ⊕ s J ) which is a principal component in the calculations made in step 3 of our list-decoder LD C .
Claim 2. Let s J and C be defined as in the description of LD
the following equalities hold:
where the probabilities are taken over the choices of s j in step 1 of LD C . 
Implementation of list-decoder LD
C : Let LD have oracle access to C: {0, 1} n → {0, 1, ⊥}. On input l and n, LD C proceeds as follows:
Define a predictor C that uses C so that
Proof. We observe that
if C answers correctly,
As J is nonempty, the value of e i ⊕ s J will be uniformly distributed and thus the probability that C answers "⊥" is s, incorrectly is e and correctly is c.
As a consequence of their construction, the values of s J , for nonempty J ⊆ [l], are pairwise independent and uniformly distributed. Let L be defined as
It is a sum of expressions of the form that is analyzed in Claim 2. The probability of different results (expressed in terms of the ith bit of x) of each term in this sum is specified in the claim. Using the value (sign) of the sum we can thereby guess the ith bit of x and by knowing the different probabilities we can calculate an upper bound for the probability that the guess is incorrect.
For our guess to be correct we would like to have more terms that equal (−1)
b(e i ,x) . As we know the probability for each outcome we can, by using Chebyschev's inequality (defined below), give an upper bound on the probability that the guess is incorrect. For every nonempty J ⊆ [l], define ζ = 2 l − 1 is the number of terms in the sum) and the standard deviation σ is less than √ N e (using the fact of pairwise independency). We set t = √ N (c − e)/2 √ e which gives us
Applying the same inequality on the number of correct answers
If none of the sums J ζ J c and J ζ J e deviates more than N (c − e)/2 from their expected values we can conclude that the number of correct answers outnumbers the number of incorrect answers. Thus, the probability that this is not the case and thereby we are not able to make a correct prediction is at most 4(e + c)/N (c − e) 2 . For the algorithm to succeed (in the supposed fashion) each of the n different bits of x has to be predicted correctly. In other words d i L has to have the correct sign for each i ∈ [n]. An upper bound for this not occurring is 4n(e + c)/N (c − e) 2 which is the sum of the upper bounds for each bit prediction failure. If N ≥ 8n(e + c)/(c − e) 2 , then this bound is less than one-half. As N equals 2 l − 1 we conclude that if the input l satisfies
then the probability that x appears in the output list is at least one-half. 
Efficiency of LD
where 
we can calculate all variables on the formâ 
To calculateâ
for k = 0 we have to make an oracle query for each value of J , giving a total of 2 l oracle queries. If k > 0 we instead perform an addition or subtraction (demanding constant time) for eachâ k,J L we calculate, giving a total work time of
By identifyingâ L as the discrete Fourier transform of the function a(J ): 2
[l] → R (neglecting a constant factor) we see that the above algorithm is essentially the fast Fourier transform algorithm.
Goldreich-Levin Hard-Core Bit
In this section we make an efficient reduction from inverting a function f to predicting the Goldreich-Levin bit of f . The list-decoding algorithm from the previous section is the main component of the algorithm that performs the reduction. Theorem 3. Let P be a probabilistic algorithm with running time t P : N → N, and rate δ P : N → [0, 1] and advantage ε P : N → [0, 1 2 ] in predicting b(x, r ) from f (x) and r . Define h(n) to be log 2 (δ P (n)/ε P (n)
2 ). Then there exists an algorithm Inv that runs in expected time
and satisfies
The theorem states that if there is an algorithm P that predicts the Goldreich-Levin bit of f , then there exists an algorithm Inv that inverts f . If P, for all possible values of x, would have approximately the same advantage (and rate) in predicting b(r, x) from f (x) and r , this can be shown by directly applying the list-decoding algorithm LD with the appropriate value of l. However, as this is not true in general we need to make an averaging argument. This is done by calling LD with small values on l with high probability (to cope with values of x giving P a high advantage), and calling LD with Description of inverter Inv: P is a predictor with rate δ P (n) and advantage ε P (n). On input y = f (x) and n Inv proceeds as follows:
1. Select j from {−1, . . . , h − 2}, where h = h(n) = log(δ P (n)/ε P (n) 2 ) , with probability 2 j−h and set l = log(nδ P (n)/ε P (n) 2 ) − j + 2. If no j is chosen, stop and output ⊥. big values on l with low probability (to cope with values of x giving P an intermediate advantage).
Call the list-decoder LD
Proof. The inverting algorithm Inv is depicted in Table 2 . For readability reasons we fix the value of n and let ε def = ε P (n) and δ def = δ P (n). Before proceeding to the analysis of the success probability of Inv we need some more specific definitions about the predicting capabilities of the predictor P. By ε x and δ x we denote the rate and the advantage of the predictor P when the value of x is fixed,
Furthermore, we define S j to be the set of all x ∈ {0, 1} n with ε x > 0 such that
and let q j be the fraction of x ∈ S j , that is to say q j def = 2 −n |S j |. (If δ x = 0 we know that ε x = 0 and we define ε 2 x /δ x as equal to zero, and thus those x are not contained in any set S j .)
The success probability of Inv depends upon the success probability of the list-decoder which is stipulated by Theorem 1. We view P f (x) (·) 
then the success probability of the list-decoder LD P f (x) is at least one-half. If the listdecoder is successful, then x has to appear in its output which will cause Inv to output x (or some x such that f (x ) = f (x)) successfully.
We now proceed to analyze the success probability of Inv. We show that if x ∈ S j and j is selected, then the condition on l is satisfied. Remember that the condition is l ≥ log(2nδ x /ε
2 ) (where the second inequality follows from the fact that j ≤ h − 2) implying that if l ≥ log(2 2− j (nδ/ε 2 )), then the list-decoder will succeed with probability at least onehalf. If j is selected we set l = log(nδ/ε 2 ) + 2 − j and thereby the condition on l is fulfilled and x will show up in the output from the list-decoder with at least probability one-half, as long as x ∈ S j .
A lower bound for the probability that the inverting algorithm succeeds can now be calculated:
We now show that
enabling us to conclude that the success probability of Inv is (2
.
From the definition of S j we know that for x ∈ S j we have that ε
Note that ε x > 0 implies that δ x > 0 so we do not have to worry about division by zero. Dividing both sides by 2 n+1 (ε 2 /δ) and using that S j = ∅ for j > h − 2 gives
The following claim helps us analyze the left-hand side of the inequality.
Claim 4. Let ε, δ, ε x and δ x be defined as above, then
Proof. We regard the values of ε x as fixed for all x and all the δ x as non-negative variables under the constraint that 2
−n x δ x = δ, and try to minimize the sum appearing in the claim. We define f to be the sum with variables δ x ,
We can assume that all ε x are non-negative because substituting negative values of ε x with zero would only increase the right-hand side of the equation and keep the left-hand side fixed. (We can even decrease the left-hand side by setting δ x = 0 and increase δ x for some x with positive ε x .)
We note that by setting δ *
−n
x ε x /ε = δ and get equality in the equation in the claim as
Still to be shown is that setting δ x = δ * x is in fact optimal if we want to minimize f under the constraint that 2 −n x δ x = δ and δ x ≥ 0. Therefore assume that this is not the case and that there is an assignment {δ x } such that f ({δ x }) < f ({δ * x }) while fulfilling the constraints 2 
for all admissible (positive) values on δ x . We use this expression and the fact that −ε
However, this contradicts our assumption and thus the claim is correct.
Now we continue the proof of Theorem 3. We know that
j=−∞ q j ≤ 1) and can therefore conclude, using Claim 4 on the left-hand side of (2), that
As noted earlier this enables us to draw the conclusion that Inv succeeds in inverting a randomly chosen x with probability (ε 2 /δ) as stated in Theorem 3. Still to be shown is the expected running time of Inv. The running time of Inv depends on the value of l that is set in the first step of the algorithm. In the second step the listdecoding algorithm takes time O(nl2 l ) and also n2 l queries to P have to be processed. In total the step takes time O(nl2 l ) + t P (n) · n2 l which makes the running times of the other parts of the algorithm negligible. As l = log(nδ/ε 2 ) − j + 2 we conclude that the running time of (n)) and thereby the expected running time is
which establishes Theorem 3.
We note that it seems unavoidable that the running time of Inv is expressed in expected time instead of strict time if we do not want to worsen the time-success ratio. This is realized by considering the case when P answers and answers correctly with the same probability for all values of x (δ x = δ P (n) and ε x = ε P (n) for all x of length n). When Inv calls LD, P is invoked 2 l times where l has to be at least log(nδ P (n)/ε P (n) 2 ) for LD to work in the supposed fashion. Thus, every time Inv succeeds in inverting f it has used considerably more time than it uses on average.
Another observation on Theorem 3 is that knowledge about the value of ε P (n) 2 /δ P (n) is required if we would like to implement Inv. Therefore we define a new algorithm Inv , with oracle access to a predictor P, that takes an additional input h and behaves exactly as Inv but uses h instead of log(δ P (n)/ε P (n)
2 ) in the first step of the algorithm. From the proof of Theorem 3 we can conclude that as long as h ≥ log(δ P (n)/ε P (n)
2 ) the probability of success will not decrease and the running time and the number of queries to P will be the same as in Theorem 3 except that we substitute log(δ P (n)/ε P (n)
2 ) with h. We thus have the following corollary which will be useful in the proof of Theorem 6.
Corollary 5. Let P be an arbitrary algorithm predicting b(x, r ) from f (x) and r . There exists an algorithm Inv with oracle access to P such that on input y, n and h it runs in expected time h 2 log 2 (n) · O(n 2 ) and makes an h · O(n 2 ) number of expected calls and satisfies
, where P has rate δ P : N → [0, 1] and advantage ε P : N → [0, 1 2 ] in predicting b(x, r ) from f (x) and r .
Nearly One-Sided Statistical Tests
A statistical test is a probabilistic algorithm that takes an input and outputs a bit. The purpose of a statistical test is to distinguish between different distributions. This is done by having different output distributions when the input is drawn from different distributions. The output distribution is characterized by the probability that the output is equal to one, respectively zero. If the test rarely outputs 1, on uniform input, we consider the test to be nearly one-sided. The classical way to measure how well a statistical test distinguishes between two distributions (or in fact two ensembles of distributions) is through the following definition.
Definition 2. An algorithm D: {0, 1}
* → {0, 1} δ(n)-distinguishes the ensembles X = {X n } and Y = {Y n } if for infinitely many values of n,
The characterization of a statistical test in terms of this definition is rather coarse. For example, it cannot be used to show if a test is nearly one-sided. This is remedied by the definition of a parameterized distinguisher which for a test and two input distributions separates the corresponding output distributions by imposing two specific thresholds.
Definition 3. An algorithm D: {0, 1}
* → {0, 1} (δ 1 (n), δ 2 (n))-distinguishes the ensembles X = {X n } and Y = {Y n } if for infinitely many values of n,
In addition, D is said to be a (δ 1 
Let D be a (δ 1 (n), δ 2 (n) )-distinguisher for the ensembles X = {X n } and Y = {Y n }. If δ 1 (n) is "small," then D is said to be a nearly one-sided statistical test with respect to X . For the special case when X is the ensemble of the uniform distributions (i.e., X i = U i for all i ∈ N), then D is merely said to be a nearly one-sided statistical test. As previously mentioned, we do not properly define the notion of a "nearly one-sided statistical test" as we do not define "small," but instead we use the more general notion of a parameterized distinguisher to express the formal result (i.e., Theorem 6).
We now discuss the connection between statistical tests and predictors, and in particular how a nearly one-sided statistical test for the Goldreich-Levin bit can be easily turned into a low rate predictor that predicts the Goldreich-Levin bit.
Assume that a distinguisher D satisfies
and
It is easy to transform this distinguisher into a predictor P guessing b(r, x) with ad-
, r, σ ) = 1 and otherwise outputs 1 − σ . However, if the probability p 1 is very small, then the truly informative answers from D are when it returns 1. In those cases the probability that the prediction is correct is
This should be compared with the success probability when D outputs 0,
giving an advantage of
(Note that we have implicitly extended the notion of advantage to apply when also conditioned on the output of D.) Assume that the test is nearly one-sided (with respect to the input distribution {( f (x), r, σ ) | r, x ∈ U n , σ ∈ U 1 }) and thereby the value of p 1 is close to zero. In this case the advantage of the prediction when D outputs 1 is a factor p −1 1 better than if it outputs 0. This is why it is better to change P slightly so it still returns σ iff D( f (x) , r, σ ) = 1 but otherwise outputs ⊥. This new predictor has rate p 1 and advantage ( p 2 − p 1 )/2. Thus we have transformed a nearly one-sided statistical test for the Goldreich-Levin bit into a low rate predictor that predicts the Goldreich-Levin bit.
Blum-Micali Pseudo-Random Generator
In [5] Blum and Micali constructed a PRBG based on a one-way permutation and a hard-core predicate associated with the permutation. As an example they used exponentiation modulo a prime as a one-way permutation and the most significant bit as its hard-core predicate. By using an arbitrary one-way permutation and the hard-core predicate of Goldreich-Levin [10] the following construction, referred to as BMGL, is obtained:
* → {0, 1} * be a polynomial-time-computable lengthpreserving permutation and let l: N → N where n < l(n). Given the input x 0 and r such that |x 0 | = |r | = n, define
, The security of the BMGL is described by our next theorem. For nearly one-sided tests the reduction is an improvement over the previous most efficient reduction. 
, where t f (n) is the time to calculate the function f on an n-bit input and
for infinitely many values of n. 
Implementation of inverter Inv :
The inverter has access to a distinguisher D: {0, 1} l(n) → {0, 1}. On input y, Inv proceeds as follows:
1. Choose i ∈ [l(n)] uniformly, where n = |y|. 2. Choose j from {−2, −1, . . . , log l(n) } with probability 2 −(3+ j) . 3. Call Inv from Corollary 5 with input y, n and 2 providing P i as the predictor. Return the output from Inv P i .
The predictor P i constructs z according to H i n and makes a prediction if D(z) = 1. Thus the rate of the predictor (the probability that the output is not ⊥) is δ i . For P i to be successful in its prediction it has to choose σ = b( f −1 (y), r ) in step 2. Now condition on that event when constructing z in P i . In this case z is constructed according to H i−1 n , as in P i−1 , and the rate of P i is thus δ i−1 . The probability that σ is chosen equal to b( f −1 (y), r ) is one-half implying that the success probability of P i is 1 2 Table 4 presents our inverter Inv . It uniformly selects a predictor and guesses a value h and invokes the inverting algorithm Inv from Corollary 5. If the guessed value is large enough compared with the predicting quality of the predictor, the corollary can be used to obtain a lower bound on the probability that Inv succeeds in inverting. This enables us to derive a lower bound on the probability that Inv succeeds in inverting its input.
We start the analysis by looking at the predicting capabilities of the predictors P i for i ∈ [l(n)]. We can assume that δ i ∈ [δ l(n) , δ 0 ] for all i ∈ [l(n)] because given the rates
we can construct the rates
otherwise that only weaken the predicting capabilities of all the predictors that have a positive advantage, which are the only ones that add to the success probability of Inv . By a similar argument we can assume that δ i ≤ δ i−1 . Define S j to be the set containing all i ∈ [l(n)] such that
and let q j be the fraction of i ∈ S j , q j def = |S j |/l(n). We note that
for infinitely many values of n, and can thus conclude, by adding the upper bounds, that for these values of n,
Multiplying the above equation by 2/( p 2 (n) − p 1 (n)) and substituting |S j |/l(n) with q j we get
The set S j has to be empty if 2 j > l(n) and
If the parameters i and h are set in Inv such that h ≥ log(δ i /ε 2 i ), then the success probability for Inv is (2 −h ) according to Corollary 5. This occurs if i and j are chosen so that i ∈ S j because then δ i ≤ p 2 (n) (for infinitely many values of n) and
according to the definition of S j and thus we have
A lower bound on the total success probability of Inv which is valid for infinitely many values of n can now be expressed:
The running time of the predictor P i , called
The first two steps of Inv can be done in time O(log(l(n))) which is negligible compared with the running time of the last step. Corollary 5 states that the expected running time for
The expected running time of Inv is thus
The second equality is justified because the term with j = k is always at least twice as big as the term with j = k + 1. As the first term in the sum is with j = −2 we can conclude that the whole sum is at most that term doubled. This concludes the proof of Theorem 6.
Applications
Using pseudo-random material instead of real random material in probabilistic algorithms may be convenient for many reasons. A system can have problems obtaining enough random material or the results perhaps need to be reproducible without storing all the random material used.
An important use of pseudo-random material can be found in many implementations of cryptographic primitives. The security definitions of these primitives often express either the need for authentication or that of confidentiality. In the case of authentication there is often a natural nearly one-sided test corresponding to an attacker of the protocol, but in the case of confidentiality this is not always so.
Here we consider the security consequences of using pseudo-random material from a PRBG instead of true random bits in a cryptographic system. We assume that the system that uses true randomness is secure and want to establish that the corresponding system is also secure. The standard method for showing this is done by assuming that there is a successful attacker, when using pseudo-random material in the system, and transforming this attacker into a statistical test distinguishing between output from the PRBG and the uniform distribution. This statistical test will become nearly one-sided if the successful attacker produces a certain type of breaking which we call verifiable breakings. If the PRBG is BMGL, then the proof of security can prosper by our more efficient reduction established in Theorem 6. With a verifiable breaking of a cryptographic system we mean that a successful breaking can be verified, possibly with the help of secrets lying in the system such as secret keys.
Signature Schemes
As an example of how natural nearly one-sided tests come up in the case of authentication, we take a closer look at signature schemes. Using the standard definition of security in an adaptive chosen message attack environment [11] , an attacker may query an oracle for signatures of any messages of its choosing. The attacker is considered successful if it, on a verification key as input, can output a valid signature on any message. Furthermore, the signature should of course not be identical to a signature returned by the oracle. If there is an attacker (from a certain group of attackers) that has more than a negligible probability of breaking the signature scheme, then the signature scheme is considered to be insecure against that group of attackers. Now assume that S is a secure signature scheme but S G is not, where the only difference between S G and S is that S G uses bits from a pseudo-random generator G when S uses true random bits. Then there is an adversary A that can break the signature scheme S G , but not S, with non-negligible probability. This adversary can be easily transformed into a nearly one-sided statistical test D, distinguishing between the output of G and the uniform distribution, by first simulating S, using its input as the source of randomness and then attacking S using A.
Encryption Schemes
A natural way to define the security of an encryption system is to say that given a ciphertext it should be infeasible to produce the corresponding plaintext. If we adopted this as our security definition, an attacker A could be easily turned into a natural nearly one-sided test that would distinguish between encryptions made by a secure encryption scheme and encryptions made by an encryption scheme that A attacks successfully. In particular, this means that if we exchange the true random material that is used in a secure encryption scheme against bits produced by a generator, then a successful attacker on the resulting scheme can be turned into a nearly one-sided test distinguishing between the uniform distribution and the generator output.
Unfortunately, this natural way of defining security is not strict enough for all situations. In general we do not permit an attacker to be able to conclude anything at all about the plaintext by looking at the ciphertext. This notion was captured by the definition of semantic security in [11] . Using this definition there is no natural way to transform an attacker into a nearly one-sided test. For example, if an adversary could predict, by looking at a ciphertext, the ith bit of the plaintext (that was drawn from the uniform distribution) with probability 1 2 + ε, where ε is non-negligible, this would render the system insecure. However, this adversary corresponds with a predictor with rate one, and thus not to a nearly one-sided test.
Other Applications
In many algorithms pseudo-randomness is provided by a pseudo-random function. A well-known construction of pseudo-random functions is the GGM construction [8] which uses a pseudo-random generator as a building block. We note that a nearly one-sided statistical test, distinguishing between the use of real random functions and a family of GGM functions, can be transformed into a nearly one-sided statistical test distinguishing the uniform distribution and the underlying generator output. Briefly, this is so because the hybrid arguments used in the security proof of GGM will uphold the one-sidedness in distinguishing between real random functions and GGM functions.
For some applications in simulations, nearly one-sided tests will occur naturally. Consider a probabilistic algorithm for a decision problem that errs with very small probability. Assume that this algorithm uses the output from a PRBG as its source of randomness and that this causes the algorithm to err with substantially higher probability. Then this algorithm can be used to produce a nearly one-sided test distinguishing the PRBG output and the uniform distribution.
Open Problems
In this work we have studied nearly one-sided tests for the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit. A natural extension would be to consider what impact nearly one-sided tests have on other hard-core predicates. Additional applications where nearly one-sided tests occur could also be investigated.
